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Summary findings
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Do some gain while others lose? Does pro-poor  growth  growth-oriented  policies.
mean more or less aggregate growth?
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I  Helpful comments on this article were received from Nancy Birdsall, Bill Easterly, Paul Isenman,
Ravi Kanbur, Aart Kraay, Branko Milanovic, Giovanna Prennushi, Dominique van de Walle, Nicolas van
de Walle, Michael Walton and seminar participants at the World Bank.1.  Introduction
The recent backlash against globalization has given new impetus to an old debate on
whether the poor benefit from economic growth. The following quotes from The Economist seem
to represent well the two main opposing views on the matter:
"Growth  really does help the poor: in fact it raises their incomes  by about  as much  as it raises the
incomes  of everybody  else. ... In short,  globalization  raises incomes,  and the poor participate
fully." (The  Economist,  May  27 2000,  p.94.)
"There is plenty  of evidence  that current  patterns  of growth  and globalization  are widening
income  disparities  and hence  acting as a brake  on poverty  reduction."  (Justin  Forsyth,  Oxfam
Policy  Director,  Letter  to The  Economist,  June 20, 2000, p.6.)
Here we seem to have irreconcilable positions about how much the world's poorest benefit from
the economic growth that is fuelled by greater openness to foreign trade and investment. The
Economist's own article is adamant that such growth is poverty reducing, drawing on a recent
study by Dollar and Kraay (2000) which found that average incomes of the poorest quintile
moved almost one-for-one with average incomes overall. In commenting on The Economist's
article, Oxfam's Policy Director seems equally confident that rising inequality is choking off the
potential benefits to the poor, in seeming contradiction to the Dollar and Kraay results, and
earlier results in the literature pointing in the same direction.2
However, as this article will argue, there is some truth in both the quotes above. Indeed, it
is not difficult to reconcile these two views, with important implications for development policy.
In critically reviewing the arguments in this debate, I will draw heavily on evidence from a new
compilation of household level data for developing countries. The following section discusses
these data, while section 3 looks at what they show about how much the poor benefit have
2  Earlier  contributions  include  Fields (1989),  World  Bank (1990,  Chapter  3), Squire (1993),
Ravallion  (1995),  Ravallion  and Chen  (1997)  and Bruno  et al., (1998).
2benefited from rising average living standards in developing countries, and how much they have
lost from contractions. Section 4 then points to some potential pitfalls in interpreting the
implications of that evidence for development policy.  The article then considers in more detail
the ways in which distribution matters to the outcomes for the poor - both as an impediment to
growth (section 5) and as an impediment to poverty-reducing growth (section 6). The
penultimate section draws out some implications for understanding global progress against
poverty. Section 8 concludes with some observations about directions for future research.
2.  New evidence on an old debate
Data on poverty and inequality are obtained from household surveys, in which random
samples of households are interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The main data I will
draw on here relate to "spells" defined by the periods of time spanning two successive household
surveys for a given country. From the latest update of the data base on which the World Bank's
tabulations of income distribution are based (Chen and Ravallion, 2000), one can assemble two
or more household surveys over time for about 50 developing countries, to create 120 such
spells, mostly in the 1990s. 3 The estimates of poverty and inequality measures were done from
the primary data (rather than using secondary sources), so that it was possible to eliminate
obvious inconsistencies.  Comparisons over time between any two surveys use the same
indicator of economic welfare, which was either income or expenditure per person. Half the time
it is expenditures. The underlying household surveys are nationally representative and in almost
all cases include imputed values for income or consumption-in-kind from own-farm output.
3  The latest version  of the data set can be found  at http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/
This web site is updated  regularly;  the results  in this paper  are based on the data set at mid-2000,  as used
in Chen and Ravallion  (2000).
3The data are not without problems; indeed, there are many concerns, related to
underlying differences (between countries and over time) in the original household surveys that
were the source of the data on household incomes and expenditures.  There are also concerns
about how best to deflate nominal values for changes in the cost-of-living; the available
consumer price indices do not always reflect well the spending behavior of the poor. On top of
these problems, there is likely to be underestimation of incomes and spending in household
surveys, particularly (but probably not only) by the rich, who often do not want to participate, or
are hard to reach, or deliberately understate their incomes or spending. Nothing much can be
done to fix these problems.  However, one can still take partial account of the data problems by
using methods of analysis that are not likely to be too sensitive to the errors in the data.
In examining the effect of growth on poverty there is also a question: "growth of what?"
We want to know whether the poor are sharing in the growth in average living standards.
However, there are two quite distinct, and largely independent, sources of data on a country's
average welfare, as measured by households'  command over commodities. The level of private
consumption expenditure (PCE) per capita from the national accounts (NAS) is widely used for
this purpose. On the other hand, measures of average household living standards are available
from the same household surveys used to measure poverty.
These two measures do not agree in general, either in the levels and in their growth rates.
This is not surprising, given the differences in coverage, definitions and methods.  There are the
aforementioned problems in survey data. But national accounts have their own data problems.
For example, PCE is determined residually in the NAS, after accounting for other uses of
domestic output and imports at the commodity level. It is not generally possible to separate the
spending by non-profit institutions (such as NGOs, religious groups, and political parties) from
4that of households. In many developing countries, the non-household sectors that are implicitly
lumped together with households appear to be sizable and possibly growing, so PCE may well
overstate the growth rate in household welfare. There are also consistency problems between the
two sources, such as arising from imperfect matching between survey dates (which also vary
between types of commodities, according to assumed recall periods) and the accounting periods
used in the NAS.
There are differences in the extent of these data concerns both between regions and
between types of surveys. India stands out as an unusual case in the 1  990s. The growth rates in
consumption that we have seen in the national accounts for India in the 1  990s have not been
reflected in the main national household survey of expenditures on consumption (the National
Sample Survey). This divergence is naturally putting a break on how much poverty reduction we
are seeing in the survey data during this period of economic growth (Datt, 1999). At the same
time, measured inequality is increasing (Ravallion, 2000c), which is not helping either.
How one interprets the data for India depends critically on why we are seeing this rising
divergence between the two data sources on consumption. One interpretation assumes that
consumptions of the poor are being underestimated by the surveys, and concludes that poverty is
falling much faster than the survey data suggest (Bhalla, 2000). While agreeing that the surveys
are probably missing a share of the consumption gains, an alternative interpretation says that the
problem is much more to do with consumption by the nonpoor, and that the surveys are more
likely to be underestimating the rate of increase in inequality.
The latter interpretation would appear to accord with our limited knowledge of the
problems of under-reporting and non-compliance in consumption and income surveys.  The fact
that the divergence is correlated with growth (over time, and across states if India) also suggests
5a strong income effect on survey underestimation, which one expects to hold also between
households (Ravallion, 2000c). Nonetheless, the problem is unlikely to be confined solely to the
non-poor, and the surveys could well be underestimating the rate of poverty reduction in India.
If one is willing to discount income (rather than expenditure) surveys for measuring
average levels of economic welfare, and if one puts aside the (highly problematic) data from the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe for growth rates, then the tests for bias
reported in Ravallion (2000a) do not point to a systematic overall discrepancy between national
accounts and survey-based estimates of aggregate consumption. (This holds in the aggregate
across countries; large discrepancies can still be found for specific countries, in both directions.)
Nonetheless, it is notable that in the aggregate, and for most regions, the implied elasticity of the
survey mean to NAS consumption growth is less than one (even when the difference is not
statistically significant). This could well be an attenuation bias due to measurement error. By
implication, elasticities of measured poverty to NAS growth will be less than those implied by
the measured elasticities of poverty to growth in the survey mean.
The fact that the mean from the surveys is consistent with the data used to calculate
poverty measures makes it an appealing candidate for measuring the growth rate. However, this
creates a further problem, namely that survey measurement errors can create a spuriously high
correlation between poverty measures and the means of the distributions on which those
measures are based. The fact that there is measurement error in the surveys (probably creating a
spurious correlation between measured poverty and the measured mean) speaks to the use of
econometric methods that are robust to this type of problem. Examples will be given later.
There is also a question of how inequality should be measured. The most popular
measure of inequality is the Gini index, ranging from zero (when everyone has the same income)
6to 100% (when the richest person has all the income). That is the measure I will use here. There
are many other possible measures, using different weights on income levels (relative to the
mean) to those used by the Gini index, based on ranks. There is also a natural measure of
distribution as relevant to poverty, namely the distributional component of the poverty measure,
obtained by setting the poverty line at a constant proportion of the mean (Datt and Ravallion,
1992). However, for the purpose of the present discussion, I will rely solely on the Gini index.
3.  Poverty reduction and growth in average living standards
Earlier versions of this data set indicated little or no correlation between growth in
average household income per person and the change in measured inequality (Ravallion, 1995;
Ravallion and Chen, 1997). This also holds in the new version of the data set; the correlation
coefficient between the annualized change in log Gini index and the annualized change in the log
of the survey mean is -0.09. Similarly, Dollar and Kraay (2000) find that, across countries, log
mean income of the poorest quintile (inferred from distributional shares and GDP per capita)
changes one-to-one with the overall log GDP per capita. This is equivalent to saying that the
share of the poorest quintile is uncorrelated with log GDP per capita.
However, it does not follow that growth raises incomes of the poor ".. by about as much
as it raises the incomes of everybody else" (in the quote from The Economist at the beginning of
this article). Finding that the share of income going to the poor does not change on average with
growth does not mean that growth raises the incomes of the poor as much as for the rich. Given
existing inequality, the income gains to the rich from distribution-neutral growth will of course
be greater than the gains to the poor. For example, the income gain to the richest decile in India
will be about four times higher than the gain to the poorest quintile; it will be 19 times higher in
7Brazil. 4 The fact that, on average, the rich will tend to capture a much larger share of the
increment to national income from growth than the poor is directly implied by the empirical
results in the literature, including Dollar and Kraay (2000).
Of course, if distributional shares do not change on average then the poor will gain in
absolute terms: growth is poverty reducing, and contraction is poverty increasing.  Figure 1 plots
the proportionate changes in the poverty rate against the growth rate in average income. The
poverty measure is the proportion of people living below $1/day (using 1993 Purchasing Power
Parity exchange rates), though other poverty lines show a similar pattern.
Figure 1: Poverty tends to fall with growth in mean household
income or expenditure
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Note: Based  on data for 47 developing  countries  in the 1980s  and '90s (multiple  spells  for most countries).  The
horizontal  axis  is the annualized  change  in  the log of the real  value of survey  mean;  the vertical  axis is the
annualized  change  in the log of the percentage  of the population  living  below  $  1/day  at 1993  Purchasing  Power
Parity.  The figure  has been  trimmed  of extreme  values,  but this does not alter  the line  of best fit indicated.
4  These are based on income shares for Brazil in 1996 and consumption shares for India in 1997; in
both cases the ranking variable is per capita (World Bank, 2000a).
8The figure also gives the regression line that fits the data best. The line virtually passes
through the origin, implying that the average rate of poverty reduction at zero growth is zero -
consistent with the pattern of zero change in inequality on average. The line has a slope of -2.50
with a (heteroscedasticity corrected) standard error of 0.30 (R2=0.44). This can be thought of as
the "growth elasticity" of poverty, since the two variables are proportionate changes. Thus for
every one percent increase in the mean, the proportion of the population living below $1  /day (at
1993 Purchasing Power Parity) falls by an average of 2.5%.  For example, in a large enough
sample of countries for which exactly half of the population lives below $1/day, a 3% increase in
the mean will bring that proportion down to about 0.46. And a 3% fall in mean income will push
the poverty rate up to about 0.54 on average.
A similar pattern exists if one uses PCE per capita from the national accounts instead of
the mean from the survey, although then the correlation is not as strong, and the elasticity is
-1.96  with a considerably higher standard error of 0.89 (though still statistically significant at the
3% level). This is partly because of measurement problems, such as the fact that survey periods
do not match exactly the periods used in National Accounts. And it is partly because changes in
PCE can arise solely from the non-household sector of the economy (notably spending by
nonprofit organizations).
A possible concern about this estimate of the average "growth elasticity" of poverty is
that there may be common (negatively correlated) measurement errors in the rate of poverty
reduction and the rate of growth in the survey mean. If the second survey overestimated the
mean for some reason (relative to the first survey) it will probably underestimate poverty. To
check for a bias due to this problem, I used the growth rate in private consumption per capita
from the national accounts as the instrumental variable for estimating the regression line in
9Figure 1, i.e., as the predictor of the growth rate in the survey mean. This assumes that the errors
in the national accounts growth rate are uncorrelated with the errors in the growth rates based on
the survey means. However, this instrument is not valid for the countries of Eastern Europe and
Central Asia for which there is no correlation between the growth rates between surveys and
those from the national accounts (Ravallion, 2000a). So I dropped the data for that region. This
estimation method gave a growth elasticity of -2.07 with a standard error of 0.72 (significant at
the 1% level).
Therein lies the truth in the first quote at the start of this article. The incidence (and
depth) of absolute poverty in developing countries tends to fall with growth. This is not a new
point; indeed, the empirical relationship has been well known for some time (Bruno et al., 1998,
provide a survey). But it is worth emphasizing in the context of the recent debate.
Looking behind the averages, however, the experience is diverse. Even ignoring extreme
values, the 95% confidence interval of the last estimate of the growth elasticity implies that a one
percent rate of growth in average household income or consumption will bring anything from a
modest drop in the poverty rate of 0.6% to a more dramatic 3.5% annual decline.
Underlying this heterogeneity in the gains to the poor from a given rate of growth lies the
fact that during spells of growth or contraction one sees changes in inequality over time within
most developing economies - changes in both directions. Developing countries with a tendency
for rising inequality since the late 1  980s include Bangladesh, China, Colombia, India, the
Philippines and Viet Nam; trend declines are found in Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica and Thailand
(Ravallion, 2000b). The changes in a summary measure such as the Gini index often seem small
in magnitude. However, this can be deceptive, since even small changes in overall distribution
can matter greatly to how much the poor share in growth.
10There have been plenty of cases of rising inequality during spells of growth. Indeed,
inequality increases about half the time (Ravallion and Chen, 1997). Therein lies the truth in the
second quote at the beginning of this paper. There is ample evidence to support concerns that
high or rising inequality is putting a break on the prospects for poverty reduction through growth.
The first quote implicitly averages over this diversity in initial inequalities and how they are
changing over time; the second looks not at the averages, but the cases in which high or rising
inequality dulls the gains to the poor from growth.
4.  'No correlation' does not mean 'no impact'
The data suggest little or no correlation between growth and changes in inequality. The
same holds for growth promoting reforms for which significant correlations have rarely been
found, one way or the other. This is confmned by Dollar and Kraay (2000) who find little or no
correlation between changes in inequality and policy reforms including greater openness of the
economy.S
While this is an important finding, there are a number of reasons to be cautious in
drawing implications for policy. One possible reason for the apparent distribution-neutrality of
reform (on average) is that changes in inequality are not always well measured. For example,
although the data set used above has been constructed to try to eliminate as many of the
problems as possible, there are still changes in survey design that add noise to the measured
changes in inequality.
5  Dollar  and Kraay do find that stabilizing  against  inflation  is associated  with lower inequality.
This is consistent  with other evidence  that inflation  hurts the poor (including  Easterly  and Fischer,  2000,
using  cross-country  data, and Datt and Ravallion,  1998,  using data for India).
11Another concern is that the data being used relate to averages within countries. Aggregate
inequality or poverty may change relatively little over time, and yet there are both gainers and
losers at all levels of living. Indeed, in cases in which the survey data have tracked the same
families over time ("panel data"), it is quite common to find considerable churning under the
surface; Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) provide evidence of this for a number of countries. Some
of this reflects measurement error, but clearly not all, since the changes seen in the data are
partially explicable in terms of observable characteristics and measurable shocks.
One can find that many people have escaped poverty while others have fallen into
poverty, even though the overall poverty rate may move rather little. For example, comparing
household incomes immediately after the 1998 financial crisis in Russia with incomes of the
same households two years earlier, one finds a seemingly small two percentage point increase in
the poverty rate. However, this was associated with a large proportion of the population (18%)
falling into poverty, while a slightly smaller proportion (16%) escaped poverty over the same
period (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000a).
People are often hurting behind the averages. Panel data and observations from the
ground can reveal this, but the aggregate statistics cannot. It is important to know the aggregate
balance of gains and losses, but it will be of little consolation to those suffering to be told that
poverty is falling on average.
A further reason why low correlations are found between policy reform and changes in
overall inequality is that starting conditions vary a lot between reforming countries. One
potentially important way that countries differ initially is in the level of inequality itself
(Benabou, 1996). The changes in distribution that we see in the data are not just random
fluctuations around a constant long-run level of inequality. Indeed, there have been signs of a
12pattern of inequality convergence in the developing world (and the world as a whole). Within-
country inequality tends to be on a falling (rising) trend over time in countries with high (low)
predicted levels of inequality at an initial base date (Ravallion, 2000b). 6
The process of convergence toward medium inequality that we are seeing is not rapid. If
the present trends continue, it will take about 15 years to close just half the gap between a high
inequality country (with a Gini index of 60% say - roughly the level in Brazil) and a relatively
low-inequality country (a Gini of 30%, a bit below the level in India around 1990). As always
when generalizing from cross-country comparisons, there are deviations from these trends, both
over time and across countries. And the shortage of observations in time makes it hazardous to
identify trends. However, there are signs of inequality convergence in the data currently
available, such that developing countries are tending to become more equally unequal - heading
in the direction of the medium levels of inequality found in countries such as Jamaica, Tunisia,
the Philippines and Ecuador (Ravallion, 2000b).
This has implications for the debate about who gains from liberalizing economic reforms.
Suppose that reforming countries fall into two categories: those in which pre-reform controls on
the economy were used to benefit the rich, keeping inequality artificially high, and those in
which the controls had the opposite effect, keeping inequality low.  The reforms may well entail
sizable redistribution between the poor and the rich, but in opposite directions in the two groups
of countries.
6  Predicted  levels of initial inequality  are used  to help avoid  the spurious  signs  of convergence  than
can arise  from errors in measuring  inequality  (sometimes  called  "Galton's Fallacy");  for further
discussion  see Ravallion  (2000b).  Other  evidence  of inequality  convergence  across  countries  can be found
in Benabou  (1996).  Panizza (2000)  finds evidence  of inequality  convergence  across US states.
13One might not be surprised then that the average impact of policy reform on inequality is
not significantly different from zero. Yet there is abundant non-random distributional change
going on under the surface of this average impact calculation. This arises when policy reforms
shift the distribution of income in different directions in different countries. And it is not
implausible that they would do so, given the diversity in initial conditions across developing
countries at the time reforms begin.
Further research is needed to better understand the evident diversity in the impacts of
growth on poverty and what role policies have played.  A deeper analysis is called for of the role
of initial conditions (including distribution) and how they interact with policy change. However,
from what we know already, it is clear that finding zero average impact of policy reform on
inequality does not mean that reforms are generally distribution neutral. An average is just that,
and it is deceptive when one averages over large differences across countries in their starting
points.
5.  Inequality as an impediment to growth
There are also implications here for other areas of public policy that may well be needed
to complement growth-oriented reforms.  This is a large topic, about which much has been said
over many decades. An important starting point for policy discussion is to understand the
potential costs of high or rising inequality.
One way inequality can matter is through the rate of growth in average income. There are
a number of arguments that have been made as to why one might find that greater equality is
good for growth. A seemingly plausible argument points to the existence of credit market
failures such that the people are unable to exploit growth-promoting opportunities for investment
14in (physical and human) capital (see, for example, Benabou, 1996; Aghion et al., 1999). With
declining marginal products of capital, the output loss from the market failure will be greater for
the poor. So the higher the proportion of poor people there are in the economy the lower the rate
of growth. 7
Cross-country comparisons of growth rates provide some support for the claim that
countries with higher initial,  inequality in incomes experienced lower rates of growth controlling
for other factors such as initial average income, openness to trade and the rate of inflation.8 The
robustness of this finding has been called into question in some studies.  There are some difficult
problems in identifying this relationship empirically, and the results in the literature have not
been robust to alternative specifications, such as allowing for country fixed effects (Forbes,
1997; Li and Zou, 1998; Barro, 1999). There are a number of concems about both the data and
methods used. 9 Spurious inequality effects in an aggregate growth regression can arise from the
assumptions made in aggregating across micro-relationships, given credit market failures
(Ravallion, 1998). The validity of the common assumption that initial inequality has a linear
effect on aggregate growth is also questionable (BanerJee and Duflo, 1999, who find evidence
7  Banerjee  and Duflo (1999)  sketch  a simple  but elegant  model of the inter-generational
accumulation  of wealth in which individuals  start  with an endowment  from the previous  generation  but
face a borrowing  constraint.  In this model, individual  wealth  at one date is a concave  function  of the
individual's  endowment,  given declining  marginal  products  of capital.  Thus  mean wealth in the economy
at one date is a quasi-concave  function  of the vector  of endowments  left over from the previous  period.  It
follows  from well-known  properties  of concave  functions  that higher  initial inequality  will entail lower
future  mean wealth  for any given  initial mean  wealth.
s  Examples  include  Persson  and Tabellini  (1994),  Alesina  and Rodrik  (1994),  Birdsall  et al.,
(1995),  Clarke  (1995),  Perotti (1996),  Deininger  and Squire  (1998),  and Deininger  and Olinto  (2000).
9  There is measurement  error in both the levels  and changes  in measured  income inequality,
including  comparability  problems  between  countries  and over  time arising  from survey  error (sampling
and non-sarnpling)  and heterogeneity  in survey  design and processing  (see, for example,  Atkinson  and
Brandolini,  1999).  One expects  that this will matter more  to tests which allow  for country  fixed  effects
than standard  growth  regressions,  since  the signal-to-noise  ratio could  well be quite low for changes  in
measured  inequality  in existing  data sets.
15that changes income inequality are bad for growth, which ever way the changes go). The choice
of control variables in identifying the relationship is also open to question; for example, past tests
of the effect of inequality on growth have controlled for the human capital stock, yet reducing
investment in human capital is presumably one of the ways that inequality matters to growth.
On balance, the existing evidence using cross-country growth regressions appears to offer
more support for the view that inequality is harmful to growth than the opposite view, which was
the prevailing view in development economics for decades. That does not imply that any
reduction in inequality will enhance growth; indeed, it can have the opposite effect if it comes at
the expense of other factors that are also know to matter to growth. Reducing inequality by
adding further distortions to external trade or domestic economy will have ambiguous effects on
growth and poverty reduction.
However, given the concerns about past tests based on cross-country aggregates, it is of
interest to ask if there might be some other way of testing for an effect of initial distribution on
growth. Returning to the various theories about why initial distribution might matter one finds
that many of the proposed models share some strong and testable implications for micro data.
And example is the common feature of a number of the theoretical models based on credit-
market failures that individual income or wealth at one date is an increasing concave function of
its own past value. This implication of the class of models of distribution-dependent growth
based on credit market failures is testable on micro panel data; Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000b,
provide supportive evidence in panel data for Hungary.'I
10  Distribution-dependent  growth  is possible  without  nonlinear  income  or wealth  dynamics  at the
micro level. Such models  that have been driven  instead  by their assumptions  about  political-economy,
notably  the way initial distribution  influences  the balance  of power  over public  spending  (Alesina  and
Rodrik, 1994;  Persson  and Tabellini,  1994).
16As with macro tests of whether inequality is bad for growth, finding the appropriate
nonlinearity in household-level income dynamics would not constitute a case for public
redistribution as a means of stimulating aggregate growth. However, with the right data, dynamic
micro models of income or consumption can be augmented to allow for (possibly endogenously
placed) public programs."  Micro structural modeling of growth in the presence of specific
redistributive interventions may offer hope of a deeper understanding of the policy implications.
6.  Inequality as an impediment to pro-poor growth
Inequality also matters to the pace of poverty reduction that is achieved at any given rate
of growth. Even in the countries in which inequality is rising with growth in average living
standards, poverty is falling on average. But it typically falls at a much slower rate than in
countries experiencing more equitable growth. The median rate of decline in the proportion of
the population living below $1 per day amongst countries with both rising average income and
rising inequality was 1.3% per year. By contrast, the median rate of poverty reduction was seven
times higher, at about 10% per year, amongst the countries that combined growth in average
living standards and falling inequality (Table 1). Amongst contracting economies it also
mattered greatly what was happening to inequality; on average, when inequality was rising while
average living standards fell, the poverty rate was rising by a dramatic 14% per year, while with
falling inequality the poverty rate rose by less than two percent on average.
Calculations such as Table 1 are mechanical. They rest on the mathematical properties of
the poverty measure, which is a function of the mean of the distribution on which the measure is
I  I  For example,  research  on government  anti-poverty  programs  in China suggests  that there have
been  dynamic  consumption  gains from the program  at farm-household  level (Jalan  and Ravallion,  1998).
17based and the Lorenz curve of that distribution, roughly speaking how much "inequality" there is
in the distribution.  From the information in Table 1 it cannot be concluded that the growing
economies with rising inequality could have achieved something like a 9.6% rate of poverty
reduction, instead of 1.3% on average, if only inequality had been falling. For that to hold one
requires the assumption that the growth rate would have been no lower with falling inequality.
Again that depends critically on exactly how the reduction in inequality is achieved.
Table 1: Diverse impacts on poverty underlie the fact that changes in inequality are
uncorrelated with economic growth
What  is happening  to average  household  income
between  the surveys?
Falling  Rising
Rising  (16% of spells)  (30% of spells)
What is happening  to  Poverty  is rising at a median  Poverty  is falling at a median
inequality  between  rate of 14.3%  per year  rate of 1.3%  per year
the surveys?
(26% of spells)  (27% of spells)
Falling  Poverty is rising at a median  Poverty  is falling at a median
rate of 1.7%  per year  rate of 9.6% per year
Note:  Based  on 117  spells  between  two  household  surveys  covering  47  developing  countries  in the 1980s  and  '90s.
Poverty  is  measured  by the  % of the  population  living  below  $1/day  at 1993  purchasing  power  parity.  Inequality  is
measured  by  the  Gini  index.
Even when inequality is not rising, a high initial level of inequality can stifle prospects
for pro-poor growth. In an economy where inequality is persistently low, one can expect that the
poor will tend to obtain a higher share of the gains from growth than in an economy in which
inequality is high. To put this another way, an important determinant of the rate of poverty
reduction is the distribution-corrected rate of growth in average income, given by a measure of
initial equality (100 minus the measure of inequality) times the rate of growth. Indeed, the
18distribution-corrected growth rate knocks out the simple rate of growth when both are used in a
regression for the rate of poverty reduction between surveys across countries and time
(Ravallion, 1997). It is not the rate of growth that matters, but the distribution-corrected rate of
growth.
One can represent this in the form of a very simple model, which gives the proportionate
rate of change in measured poverty (r) over a given interval of time as:
r =,B(1-I)g
where I is an index of inequality (between zero and one) at the beginning of a period of time,
over which average income grows at a rate g. Measuring r by the annual percentage change in
the proportion of the population living below $1 per day, I  by the Gini index, and measuring g
by the rate of growth in the real value of mean income from the survey, I obtained an estimate of
-3.74 for,f, with standard error of 0.68, using 124 periods of time between household surveys in
developing countries; this is very close to the estimate in Ravallion (1997) on an earlier and
smaller data set. Again, a possible concern about this estimate is that there may be common
(negatively correlated) measurement errors in r and g.  Using again the growth rate in private
consumption per capita from the national accounts as the instrumental variable for the growth
rate in the survey means and dropping the observations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia one
gets a lower estimate of  ,,  namely -2.94, with standard error of 1.  18.
The elasticity of poverty to growth declines appreciably as the extent of initial inequality
rises. Consider a per capita growth rate of (say) 2% per annum (roughly the mean for low-
income countries in the 1  990s). With ,B  = -3 a country with high inequality (a Gini index of 60%
say) can expect to see a rate of poverty reduction of 2.4% per year. By contrast, a relatively low-
inequality country, with a Gini of 30%, can expect a rate of poverty reduction of 4.2% per year.
19Of course, other factors matter besides the distribution-corrected rate of growth, such as
economic or policy changes that resulted in changes in distribution.  We saw in Table 1 just how
much changes in inequality matter.
The above results are unrevealing about what specific aspects of inequality matter.  The
theoretical arguments based on credit-market failures point to the importance of asset inequality,
not income inequality per se, and there is evidence of strongly adverse effects of asset inequality
in growth (Ravallion, 1998, using regional data for China; Birdsall and Londono, 1997, and
Deininger and Olinto, 2000, both using cross-country data).
Some clues have been found by comparing rates of poverty reduction across states of
India, for which we can compile a long series of reasonably comparable survey data back to
about 1960. The analyses of these data confirm that economic growth has tended to reduce
poverty in India. Higher average farm yields, higher public spending on development, higher
(urban and rural) non-farm output and lower inflation were all poverty reducing (Ravallion and
Datt, 1999). However, the response of poverty to non-farm output growth in India has varied
significantly between states. The differences reflected systematic differences in initial conditions.
Low farm productivity, low rural living standards relative to urban areas and poor basic
education all inhibited the prospects of the poor participating in growth of the non-farm sector.
Rural and human resource development appear to be strongly synergistic with poverty reduction
though an expanding non-farm economy.
Economic reforms in developing countries can create opportunities for poor people. But
only if the conditions are in place for them to take advantage of those opportunities will absolute
poverty fall rapidly. Reforms often increase demand for assets, such as relatively skilled labor,
that are inequitably distributed; there is evidence that disparities in returns to investment do not
20appear to favor the poor either (van de Walle, 2000, for Viet Nam). Thus economic reforms can
readily by-pass the poor. The conditions for pro-poor growth are closely tied to reducing the
disparities in access to human and physical capital, and sometimes differences in returns to
assets, that create income inequality and probably also inhibit overall growth prospects.
Policy discussions have often emphasized the need to combine policies conducive to
growth with investments in the human and physical assets of poor people (see, for example,
World Bank, 1990, 2000b; Bruno et al., 1995; Kanbur and Squire, 1999). However, many
questions remain unanswered. What specific interventions should have priority in specific
circumstances?  Should reform be redesigned or delayed when initial conditions are not
favorable, and take time to change? Further research is needed on the contingent factors that
influence the extent to which the poor are able to participate in the opportunities created by
growth-oriented policies.
7.  Global progress against poverty?
The above arguments help in understanding what has been happening to the poverty
aggregates in the developing world. The 1  990s saw reasonable growth in the developing world
as a whole; the overall rate of growth in real per capita private consumption for the low- and
middle-income countries over 1990-97 was 2.6% per year. Yet 24% of the population of the
developing world lived below $1 per day in 1998 (at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity), which was
only 3-4 percentage points lower than 10 years earlier (Chen and Ravallion, 2000).  The total
number of poor by this standard was about the same in 1998 as 1987, with roughly 1.2 billion
people lived below $1 per day.
21Why was there not more progress against poverty? In the countries where growth
occurred it tended to be poverty reducing, though more so in low inequality countries and
countries that avoided rising inequality with growth. Differences in how much impact a given
rate of growth has on poverty reflect initial inequalities in incomes, education attainments and
other dimensions, including geographic differences within countries.
In the same way that rising inequality in one country can put a break on prospects for
poverty-reducing growth, rising inequality in the world inhibited overall poverty reduction. The
world Gini index increased from 63% in 1988 to 66% in 1993 (Milanovic, 2000).  This was
enough to wipe out a large share of the gains to the world's poor from global economic growth.
Why was world inequality rising? An important reason is rising inequality between
countries. This accounts for three-quarters of the increase in the world Gini index from 1988 to
1993 (Milanovic, 2000). The growth divergence we have seen in the 1980s and 1990s -
whereby growth rates have tended to be lower in poorer countries (Pritchett, 1997)  - is clearly
an important reason for the low rate of aggregate poverty reduction despite aggregate growth.  In
short, too little of the growth was in the poorest countries.
8.  Conclusions
The seemingly opposing positions taken in this debate are not as hard to reconcile as it
might seem at first sight. The poor typically do share in the benefits of rising affluence, and they
typically so suffer from economic contraction. However, there is a sizable variance around the
"typical" outcomes for the poor. One source of variance is that "economic growth" as measured
in the national accounts is not always reflected in average household living standards as
measured in surveys, at least in the short run.
22But the sources of the heterogeneity in outcomes for the poor go deeper than that.  There
are also differences in initial inequalities between countries, and between regions within
countries, that create sizable differences in how much the poor share in aggregate growth or
contraction. The churning that is found under the surface of the aggregate outcomes also means
that there are often losers during spells of growth, even when poverty falls on average. While
growth-promoting policies may well have close to zero average impact on inequality, this is
perfectly consistent with sizable distributional impacts in specific countries, albeit in different
directions. The finding of zero correlation between changes in inequality and growth found in
various papers in the literature is perfectly consistent with strong and pervasive distributional
effects. There is truth in both the quotes at the beginning of this paper, though each is potentially
deceptive on its own.
These observations point to the importance of more micro, country-specific, research on
the factors determining why some poor people are able to take up the opportunities afforded by
an expanding economy - and so add to its expansion - while others are not. Individual
endowments of physical and human capital have rightly been emphasized in past work, and
suggest important links to policy. Other factors that may well be equally important have received
less attention, such as location, social organization and exposure to uninsured risk.
While good policy making for fighting poverty must obviously be concerned with the
aggregate impacts on the poor, it cannot ignore the diversity of impacts underlying the averages,
and it is here that good micro empirical work can help. That diversity also holds potentially
important clues as to what else needs to be done by governments to promote poverty reduction,
on top of promoting economic growth.
23References
Aghion,  Philippe,  Eve Caroli  and Cecilia  Garcia-Penalosa,  1999,  "Inequality  and Economic
Growth:  The Perspectives  of the New Growth  Theories",  Journal  of Economic  Literature
37(4): 1615-1660,  1999.
Alesina,  Alberto  and Dani Rodrik,  1994,  "Distributive  Politics  and Economic  Growth",
Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  108:  465-90.
Atkinson,  A.B., and A. Brandolini,  1999,  "Promise  and Pitfalls  in the Use of 'Secondary'
Data Sets: Income  Inequality  in OECD  Countries,"  mimeo,  Nuffield  College
Oxford.
Banerjee,  Abhijit  and Esther  Duflo, 1999,  "Inequality  and Growth:  What Can the Data
Say?", mimeo,  Department  of Economics,  MIT.
Barro,  Robert, 1999,  "Inequality,  Growth  and Investment",  NBER  Working  Paper 7038.
Baulch,  Bob and John Hoddinott,  2000, "Economic  Mobility  and Poverty  Dynamics  in
Developing  Countries,"  Journal  of Development  Studies  36(6): 1-24.
Benabou,  Roland, 1996,  "Inequality  and Growth",  in Ben Bemanke  and Julio Rotemberg
(eds) National  Bureau of Economic  Research  Macroeconomics  Annual,
Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  pp.  11-74.
Bhalla,  Surj  it, 2000, "Growth  and Poverty  in India  - Myth and Reality",  available  from
http://www.oxusresearch.com/economic.asp.
Birdsall,  Nancy and Juan Luis Londono,  1997,  "Asset Inequality  Matters:  An Assessment  of the
World  Bank's Approach  to Poverty  Reduction."  American  Economic  Review,  Papers  and
Proceedings  87(2):  32-37.
Birdsall,  Nancy, D. Ross and R. Sabot,  1995,  "Inequality  and Growth  Reconsidered:  Lessons
from East Asia", World  Bank  Economic  Review  9(3):  477-508.
Bruno,  Michael,  Martin  Ravallion  and Lyn Squire, 1998,  "Equity  and Growth  in Developing
Countries:  Old and New Perspectives  on the Policy Issues",  in Income Distribution  and
High-Quality  Growth  (edited  by VitoTanzi  and Ke-young  Chu), Cambridge,  Mass: MIT
Press.
Chen,  Shaohua  and Martin  Ravallion,  2000, "How  Did the World's Poorest  Fare in the 1990s?"
Policy  Research  Working  Paper  2409, World  Bank  (http://wblnO018.worldbank.org/
24Research/workpapers.nsf/WPPoverty/?OpenView&count=500000&Topic=Poverty).
Clarke, George R.G., 1995, "More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth",
Journal of Development Economics 47: 403-428.
Datt, Gaurav (1999): "Has Poverty in India Declined since the Economic Reforms?,"
Economic and Political Weekly 34 (December 11-17).
Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion, 1992, "Growth and Redistribution Components of
Changes in Poverty: A Decomposition with Application to Brazil and India,"
Journal of Development Economics, 38: 275-295.
Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion, 1998, "Farm Productivity and Rural Poverty in
India", Journal of Development Studies 34: 62-85.
Deininger, Klaus and Pedro Olinto, 2000, "Asset Distribution, Inequality and Growth", Policy
Research Working Paper 2375, World Bank.
Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire, 1998, "New Ways of Looking at Old Issues:
Inequality and Growth," Journal of Development Economics 57(2): 259-87.
Dollar, David and Aart Kraay, 2000, "Growth is good for the poor", World Bank, Washington
DC.
Easterly, William and Stanley Fischer, 2000, "Inflation and the Poor," Journal of Money Credit
and Banking, forthcoming.
Fields, Gary,  1989, "Changes in poverty and inequality in developing countries', World Bank
Research Observer, 4:167-186.
Forbes, Kristin J., 1997, "A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and
Growth," mimeo, Department of Economics, MIT.
Jalan, Jyotsna and Martin Ravallion, 1998, "Are There Dynamic Gains from a Poor-Area
Development Program?" Journal of Public Economics, 67(1): 65-86.
and  _,  1999, "Geographic  Poverty  Traps?  A
Microeconometric Model of Consumption growth in Rural China," mimeo, Development
Research Group, World Bank.
Kanbur, Ravi and Lyn Squire, 1999, "The Evolution of Thinking about Poverty: Exploring the
Interactions," Department of Agricultural, Resource and Managerial Economics Paper
99-24, Cornell University.
25Li, Hongyi and Heng-fu Zou, 1998, "Income Inequality is not Harmful to Growth:
Theory and Evidence," Review of Development Economics 2(3): 318-334.
Lokshin, Michael and Martin Ravallion, 2000a, "Welfare Impacts of Russia's 1998 Financial
Crisis" in Economics of Transition, Vol. 8(2): 269-295.
Lokshin, Michael and Martin Ravallion, 2000b, "Short-Lived Shocks with Long-Lived Impacts?
Nonlinear Household Income Dynamics in a Transition Economy," Policy Research
Working Paper, World Bank (http://wblnO018.worldbank.org/Research/workpapers.nsf/
WPPoverty/?OpenView&count=500000&Topic=Poverty).
Milanovic, Branko, 2000, "True World Income Distribution: 1988 and 1993: First Calculations
Based on Household Surveys Alone", Policy Research Working Paper 2244, World
Bank, 1999.
Panizza, Ugo, 2000, "Convergence in Income Inequality," Research Department, Inter-American
Development Bank.
Perotti, Roberto, 1996, "Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data
Say," Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 149-87.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 1994, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?"
American Economic Review 84: 600-621.
Pritchett, Lant, 1997, "Divergence, Big Time", Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 3-17.
Ravallion, Martin, 1995, "Growth and Poverty: Evidence for Developing Countries in the
1980s", Economics Letters, 48: 411-417.
, 1997, "Can High Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute Poverty?"
Economics Letters 56, 51-57.
, 1998, "Does Aggregation Hide the Harmful Effects of Inequality on
Growth?" Economics Letters, 61(1), 73-77.
, 2000a, "Do National Accounts Provide Unbiased Estimates of Survey-
Based Measures of Living Standards?"  Development Research Group, World Bank.
, 2000b, "Inequality Convergence", Development Research Group, World
Bank.
,2000c,  "Should Poverty Measures be Anchored to the National Accounts?",
Economic and Political Weekly, September.
26Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen, 1997, "What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about
Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?," World Bank Economic Review,
11(2): 357-82.
Ravallion, Martin and Gaurav Datt, 1999, "When is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from the
Diverse Experience of India's States", Policy Research Paper 2263, World Bank.
Squire, Lyn. 1993. "Fighting Poverty," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
83(2): 377-382.
van de Walle, Dominique, 2000, "Are Returns to Investment Lower for the Poor?  Human and
Physical Capital Interactions in Rural Viet Nam," Policy Research Working Paper WPS
2425, World Bank, Washington DC.
World Bank, 1990, World Development Report. Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press.
World Bank, 2000a, World Development Indicators. Washington DC: The World Bank.
World Bank, 2000b, World Development Report. Attacking Poverty. New York: Oxford
University Press.
27Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2542  Checks and Balances, Private  Philip Keefer  February 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Information, and the Credibility of  David Stasavage  37644
Monetary Commitments
WPS2543  When Do Special Interests Run  Philip Keefer  February 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Rampant? Disentangling the Role in  37644
Banking Crises of Elections, Incomplete
Information, and Checks and Balances
WPS2544  The Uniqueness of Short-Term  Leora Klapper  February 2001  A. Yaptenco
Collateralization  31823
WPS2545  Financing the Future: Infrastructure  Marianne Fay  February 2001  A. FranQois
Needs in Latin America, 2000-05  37841
WPS2546  Gender Dimensions of Pension  Paulette Castel  February 2001  J. Smith
Reform in the Former Soviet Union  Louise Fox  87215
WPS2547  The Design of Incentives for Health  Jeffrey S. Hammer  February 2001  H. Sladovich
Care Providers in Developing  William G. Jack  37698
Countries: Contracts, Competition,
and Cost Control
WPS2548  International Provision of Trade  Alan V. Deardorff  February 2001  L. Tabada
Services, Trade, and Fragmentation  36896
WPS2549  Measuring Poverty Dynamics and  Erzo F. P. Luttmer  February 2001  C. Wodon
Inequality in Transition Economies:  32542
Disentangling Real Events from
Noisy Data
WPS2550  Measuring Equity in Health Care  Adam Wagstaff  February 2001  A. Maranon
Financing: Reflections on (and  38009
Alternatives to) the World Health
Organization's Fairness of Financing
Index
WPS2551  Infrastructure Coverage and the  Kristin Komives  February 2001  S. Minovi
Poor: A Global Perspective  Dale Whittington  30012
Xun Wu
WPS2552  Inventories in Developing Countries:  J. Luis Guasch  February 2001  J. Troncoso
Levels and Determinants-a  Red Flag  Joseph Kogan  37826
For Competitiveness and Growth
WPS2553  1The  Value of Relationship Banking  Giovanni Ferri  February 2001  A. Yaptenco
during Financial Crises: Evidence  Tae Soo Kang  31823
from the Republic of Korea  In-June KimPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2554  Administrative  Costs  and the  Estelle  James  February  2001  A. Yaptenco
Organization  of Individual  James  Smalhout  31823
Retirement  Account  Systems:  Dimitri  Vittas
A Comparative  Perspective
WPS2555 Implicit  Pension  Debt,  Transition  Yan  Wang  February  2001  A. Datoloum
Cost,  Options,  and Impact  of  Dianqing  Xu  36334
China's  Pension  Reform:  Zhi  Wang
A Computable  General  Equilibrium  Fan  Zhai
Analysis
WPS2556  Household  Strategies  for Coping  with  Michael  M. Lokshin  February  2001  P.  Sader
Poverty  and Social  Exclusion  in  Ruslan  Yemtsov  33902
Post-Crisis  Russia
WPS2557  Decentralization  and Accountability: Stuti Khemani  February  2001  H. Sladovich
Are  Voters  More  Vigilant  in Local  than  3769B
in National  Elections?